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REPLY REGARDING STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
As stated in the Brief of Respondent (hereinafter "Resp. Br."), the question of 
whether an employer terminated employees for "just cause" is a mixed question of law 
and fact. The decision, however, should only be upheld if it is "supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. . . . Substantial 
evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.'" Johnson v. Department of Employment Sec, 782 P.2d 965, 968 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The decision regarding "just cause" in this case is predicated on a 
decision regarding what constitutes the "whole record," which Petitioners argue should 
include photographs of the room at issue in this case and, in the case of Mr. Record, the 
testimony of David Ratliff. The decision regarding whether the photographs and 
testimony should be part of the record is accorded "only moderate deference," as pointed 
out in Petitioners' Opening Briefs. Petitioners argue that if those photographs and Mr. 
Ratliff s testimony were included as part of the record, the decision that Petitioners were 
terminated for "just cause" must be overturned, since the photographs demonstrate that 
Zions' witnesses were lying about the file room and what Ms. Hanson saw and could 
possibly have seen. Moreover, in Mr. Record's case, the testimony of Mr. Ratliff could 
have been used to cast doubt on the credibility of Mr. Hinds, one of Zions' primary 
witnesses. 
REPLY REGARDING RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioners hereby correct Respondent's Statement of Facts as follows: 
1. Respondent states, "Mr. Hinds questioned the Claimants regarding the incident." 
Resp. Br. at 4. This is incorrect, to the extent it suggests Mr. Hinds told 
Petitioners that they were accused of being in the file room undressed or that he 
questioned them about whether this was so. Rather, Mr. Hinds only asked them if 
they were in the file room together, which they both admitted, and regarding 
which they did not see anything wrong. See Record's Opening Brief at Statement 
of Fact 15; Tanner's Opening Brief at Statement of Fact 4. 
2. Respondent states, "The Employer received complaints from employees and 
managers [that] the Claimants spent too much time together behind closed doors 
and acted inappropriately toward each other while at work." Resp. Br. at 5. It is 
important to point out that no witnesses testified as to any personal knowledge of 
any inappropriate behavior by Claimants, other than Ms. Hanson regarding the file 
room incident. Ms. Battista's note from her conversation with Mr. Record in 
September 2010 indicates that Mr. Record stated he had never behaved 
inappropriately with Ms. Tanner (Tanner R. 11); Ms. Battista testified that she had 
no personal knowledge of any inappropriate behavior between them (Tanner R. 
51:4-6); and Mr. Hinds also had no personal knowledge of any inappropriate 
behavior they had engaged in (Record R. 66:25-28). 
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3. Respondent states, "The Claimants were issued a second formal warning in 
November 2009, when the objectionable conduct continued." Resp. Br. at 5. 
Claimants dispute that they were ever given a "formal warning" about their 
conduct, and the testimony cited by Respondent does not indicate that they were 
given a formal warning. 
4. Respondent states, "Mr. Record alleges he did nothing inappropriate by meeting in 
the empty dark file room." Resp. Br. at 6. The characterization of the file room as 
"empty" is incorrect, and the testimony cited by Respondent does not support the 
statement. Rather, there were several sets of shelves in the room, and some of the 
files had boxes on them. Record R. 19; 49:24-33. 
5. Respondent states, "Mr, R_ecord testified they used the dark unused file room to 
hide their meeting in an effort to manage the perception of their relationship as 
instructed by their superiors." Resp. Br. at 6. Petitioners dispute that Mr. Record 
said he and Ms. Tanner were attempting to hide their meeting, and the cited 
testimony does not state this. Rather, Mr. Record stated that he and Ms. Tanner 
had been told to "manage perception. So the only thing we could think of to 
manage perception was to not be seen together." As for the particular meeting 
they had on February 19, 2010, he explained, "And it wasn't the sort of thing 
where I would set up a conference room, try to find one available. I was sort of an 
impulsive thing. I was already going down to see Mr. Mather. She was already 
going down to take a break. It wasn't meant to be a big thing." Record R. 073:19-
21. 
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6. Respondent states, "The Claimants allege this lack of visibility made it impossible 
for the witness to clearly see if the Claimants were undressed in the file room." 
Resp. Br. at 6. This statement is incorrect to the extent it suggests Petitioners' 
argument is that Ms. Hanson could not have seen them undressed. Actually, 
Petitioners are unequivocal that they were not undressed in the file room or even 
touching. See, e.g., Record Opening Brief Statement of Facts 32-34. The lack of 
visibility is significant because it makes clear that Ms. Hanson could not have seen 
what she claims to have seen, and that the other witnesses were lying about the 
visibility in the room, presumably to make Ms. Hanson's story more believable. 
ARGUMENT 
In its Combined Brief of Respondent, the Board argues six points: 1) There is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's decision to deny Mr. Record and 
Ms. Tanner unemployment benefits; 2) Zions had "just cause" to terminate Mr. Record 
and Ms. Tanner; 3) The Board correctly refused to admit the photographs on appeal; 4) 
the photographs would not have changed the outcome of the decisions even if they were 
admitted; 5) the Board was correct in affirming the ALJ's decision in Mr. Record's case 
to exclude Mr. Ratliff as a witness; and 6) Petitioners failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of their appeal. Petitioners respond to each of these arguments as follows: 
A. The Board Incorrectly Refused to Admit the Photographs 
Petitioners will respond first to Respondent's "Point III," regarding whether the 
Board correctly refused to admit Petitioners' new evidence, as this is the point upon 
which most of the other arguments hinge. Respondent claims that Petitioners could and 
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should have seen the need for the photographs they seek to introduce, and should have 
sought to obtain the photographs prior to the hearing on their unemployment claims. 
Respondent asserts, "The Claimants could have reasonably foreseen testimony regarding 
the visibility of the room was likely." Resp. Br. at 15. While it is arguably true that the 
general visibility across the file room was foreseeable given the information Petitioner 
had going into their respective unemployment hearings, they could not have reasonably 
foreseen the need for photographs for several reasons. First, both Mr. Record and Ms. 
Tanner were told by their respective ALJs prior to their unemployment hearings that the 
burden of proof rested with Zions, and that they did not need to provide documents that 
they wanted to request or subpoena to support their positions. Tanner, R. 153, 159; 
Record, R. 10L Given that information, they could not have foreseen the need for 
photographic evidence to impeach Zions' witnesses. Second, they could not have 
foreseen the testimony that the photographs rebut. Specifically, they could not have 
foreseen that although Ms. Hanson would testify that she could see Mr. Record and Ms. 
Tanner pulling up their pants when she walked into the file room, which was untrue, that 
Ms. Hanson would testify truthfully as to where she stood when she walked in the file 
room (in the doorway) and where Petitioners were at the time (in the back corner of the 
room, with several sets of shelving between them and the doorway), and that she did not 
have to bend down to see them. They could also not have foreseen that Ms. Hanson and 
two other Zions' witnesses, Mr. Hinds and Ms. Battista, would testify that one can clearly 
see from the doorway to the back corner of the room despite all of the shelving, which is 
provably false, but only if one has photographs of the room. Had Petitioners anticipated 
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that they might need photographs of the room, they could not have anticipated what 
angles or views of the room and shelving they might have needed. Petitioners knew, of 
course, where they were and where Ms. Hanson was in the room, but they also knew that 
one cannot see clearly through all the shelving, and therefore, they could not have 
reasonably expected that Ms. Hanson would testify truthfully as to where each of them 
were when she walked in, but testify untruthfully about the view between those locations. 
The only case Respondent relies upon to support its argument that the Board 
should have considered the photographs is Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63 (Utah 1989). That case is distinguishable from this because in Grace, the drug 
test results that the employer sought to admit after the record closed were in existence at 
the time of the hearing, but the employer did not submit them because it claimed "it was 
trying to avoid confidentiality problems and protect [the employee's] privacy interests." 
776 P.2d at 70. The court in Grace found the employer's arguments to admit the 
evidence on appeal unpersuasive. In this case, however, the photographic evidence did 
not exist at the time of the hearing, so the cases are not analogous. 
This is apparently an issue of first impression of this court: whether after-acquired 
evidence that impeaches key witness testimony or goes to the crux of the issues to be 
decided should be admitted. Respondent suggests that allowing evidence such as the 
photographs in this case would "make the Department's requirement to present all 
relevant evidence at the hearing meaningless." Resp. Br. at 16. This is not a legitimate 
argument against allowing the evidence in this case where the issue regarding visibility 
was addressed, but evidence did not exist at the time of the hearing to prove that the 
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employer's witnesses were lying, and as explained above, Petitioners could not have 
foreseen the type of photographic or other evidence that would impeach the adverse 
witnesses. Petitioners addressed the topic of visibility in the room with their own 
testimony and a diagram. They could not have foreseen that the witnesses would 
misrepresent the view in light of the shelving. 
Petitioners submit that cases in which parties could obtain evidence that would 
definitively impeach an adverse witness after a hearing would be rare (as indicated by the 
fact that there is no case law on point), such that allowing the photographic evidence in 
this case would not create any risk of a flood of similar requests for a reversal or 
rehearing. To the extent that other such situations may arise, however, Petitioners 
maintain that establishing a precedent that favors admissibility of evidence obtained after 
a hearing that proves the adverse party lied about a crucial issue addressed in the hearing 
is a rule that promotes "elementary fairness," which theoretically is the goal of the 
unemployment hearing process. 776 P.2d at 70. To the contrary, not allowing such 
evidence under any circumstances creates an incentive for parties to lie with impunity, 
and even to get additional witnesses to lie. When the party lying is the employer, such as 
in this case, this puts the employee at an enormous disadvantage, because it would be a 
rare judge that would believe a single employee over several employer witnesses with the 
same story, particularly ones with titles like Vice President and Director of Human 
Resources as in this case. The possibility that an adverse ruling can be overturned if a 
party obtains proof that testimony is false would be a way to prevent such conduct, 
providing an incentive for parties to tell the truth in the first place. 
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B. In Light of the Photographs, there is not Substantial Evidence to 
Support a Finding of Just Cause for Petitioners' Termination 
Regarding Respondent's first argument, that there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the Board's decision, this is a "Catch-22" for Petitioners, since is only 
correct if the photographic evidence of the file room is excluded. Respondent's analysis 
on this point argues that it is for the Board to assess conflicting evidence. Petitioner's 
argument, however, is that if the photographic evidence is allowed, it resolves the conflict 
between the evidence by proving that Zions' witnesses were not truthful during the 
unemployment hearing. The photographs show that Ms. Hanson could not have seen 
what she claimed to have seen, and Mr. Hinds and Ms. Battista were not truthful about 
the view from the doorway to the back corner of the room. The evidence is not 
appropriately characterized as simply "conflicting" evidence from which the fact-finder 
can choose which to believe, as Respondent describes the evidence in this case, when one 
party's evidence can be proven to be incorrect. 
Respondent argues that even if Petitioners are correct that Ms. Hanson "could not 
see who was in the file room or their state of dress," there was "just cause" for 
Petitioners' termination because they were in the file room "after having been told not to 
have any non work related contact with each other at the work place." Resp. Br. at 10. 
This argument is incorrect, as there is no evidence that Petitioners had "non work related 
contact" with each other, other than Ms. Hanson's testimony, which the photographs 
prove to be unreliable. 
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Respondent's Point II is dedicated to the "just cause" analysis, and maintains that 
Zions established culpability, knowledge, and control necessary to show just cause. 
Resp. Br. at 11-12. This argument, however, is based on the finding that Ms. Hanson saw 
Petitioners undressed in the file room. For instance, Respondent argued, "The Claimants 
knew, or should have known, that being alone together in a dark unused file room during 
work hours in a state of partial undress was inappropriate behavior " Resp. Br. at 12. 
Petitioners agree that had they been undressed in the file room together, just cause for 
their termination would be established. Given that they were not, and that they have 
photographic evidence that proves that the only "witness" to this event was either 
mistaken or untruthful, just cause has not been established. 
Respondent's Point VI, that the photographs would not change the outcome here, 
is inexplicable. Respondent argues that since the ALJs found Ms. Hanson to be more 
credible than Petitioners, then even if the photographs were allowed, the Board would 
still give more weight to Ms. Hanson's claim that she saw them unclothed. Resp. Br. at 
19. This does not make sense, given that in the photograph submitted, Mr. Record was 
sitting exactly where he was sitting when Ms. Hanson walked in the room, and Ms. 
Tanner, who is Ms. Hanson's height, took the photograph (and Ms. Hanson testified that 
she did not have to look down in order to see Petitioners when she walked in the room). 
Respondent suggests there is nothing that Petitioners can say or submit that would shake 
the Board's faith in Ms. Hanson, which does not suggest a fair hearing process. 
Respondent also suggests that the photographic evidence is flawed because it 
"captures a view of the room from one fixed point." Importantly, when they took the still 
13 
photographs submitted to the Board, Petitioners also took videos of the file room that 
provide a more comprehensive view of the shelving in the room and provide even better 
evidence that Zions' witnesses were lying, but did not know how to present such 
evidence to the Board. It does not seem to matter, given that no matter what the 
photographs show, the Board and Zions argue that they are flawed somehow. Petitioners 
believe that the photographs submitted prove that the view is so clearly obstructed from 
the doorway to the back corner of the room that the Board should have disregarded the 
testimony of Ms. Hanson, Ms. Battista, and Mr. Hinds. If this Court disagrees, and 
believes that more testimony should be allowed about whether Ms. Hanson "maneuvered 
her head to a point where she could see clearly through the shelves" (even though that is 
not possible under the circumstances), the Court should remand the case for another 
hearing on that point rather than refuse to accept the evidence. 
C. Mr. Record Should Have Been Allowed to Introduce Mr. Ratliff as a Witness 
to Impeach Mr. Hinds' Testimony 
Respondent argues that the Board correctly affirmed the ALJ's decision during 
Mr. Record's hearing to exclude the testimony of Mr. Ratliff. Mr. Record wanted to use 
Mr. Ratliff as a witness to discredit Mr. Hinds concerning his testimony about the 
meeting he had with Mr. Record on February 19, at which both Mr. Hinds and Mr. Ratliff 
were present. Respondent argues that because the conversation on February 19 is not 
relevant to whether Zions had just cause to terminate Mr. Record, it was not an error to 
exclude Mr. Ratliff. Respondent's argument, however, is incorrect given the basic 
principle that a fact-finder can disregard the entire testimony of a witness if the witness is 
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found to willfully testify falsely on any point. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1228 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, although the ALJ told Mr. Record that it was Zions' burden of proof 
to show it had just cause to terminate him, the ALJ nonetheless accepted Zions' 
witnesses' testimony uncritically. The fact that the ALJ also failed to allow Mr. Record 
the opportunity to rely on documents or witnesses that would cast doubt on the credibility 
of one of these witnesses put him a severe disadvantage. 
D. Petitioners Met Their Burden of Marshaling the Evidence 
Finally, Respondent argues that Petitioners failed to marshal the evidence to show 
that the Board's findings are clearly erroneous. Petitioners disagree. The evidence 
supporting the Board's finding that Petitioners were terminated for just cause is the 
testimony of Ms. Hanson stating that she saw Petitioners undressed together in a file 
room, and the testimony of Mr. Hinds and Ms. Battista regarding the view in that room. 
Petitioners included cites to this evidence, which was relied upon by the ALJs, in their 
Opening Briefs. Thus, they included all the material evidence relied upon by the ALJs in 
making a decision that Zions established just cause for their termination. 
The photographic evidence obtained after the hearing, however, shows that Ms. 
Hanson could not have seen Petitioners unclothed in the back corner of the room from the 
doorway in which she stood, and that Mr. Hinds and Ms. Battista incorrectly stated that 
the view across the room from the doorway to the back corner was clear. In light of the 
photographs, the ALJs reliance upon the testimony of Ms. Hanson, Mr. Hinds, and Ms. 
Battista was clearly erroneous, as was the conclusions they reached based upon this 
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testimony. It is not clear what evidence Respondent maintains Petitioners failed to 
include as part of their burden to marshal the evidence, and Petitioners dispute that this is 
a legitimate concern. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Record and Ms. Tanner respectfully request that 
the decisions of the ALJ and the Workforce Appeals Board be reversed and that they be 
awarded unemployment benefits. In the alternative, Petitioners request that their cases be 
remanded for an additional hearing to address the new evidence, as well as evidence that 
was improperly excluded from the first hearing. 
DATED this 14th day of March, 2011. 
HOLLINGSWORTH LAW OFFICE, LLC 
, ^ ^ 
April L. Hollingsworth / y 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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